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Susan E. Moyer [Argued]
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OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________________
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: Fol lo w ing  a
state court jury trial, James Mario Pridgen
(“Pridgen”) was convicted of the shooting
death of Colin Koulesser and sentenced to
life in prison.  After exhausting direct
appeals and filing an unsuccessful federal
habeas petition, Pridgen filed a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion
seeking “Relief From Judgment or Order,”
based on newly discovered evidence.  The
new evidence consisted of two affidavits
of witnesses who, according to Pridgen,
were present at the scene of the shooting
and could refute the testimony of the
state’s key witness.  The principal issue we
must determine is whether a Rule 60(b)
motion by a state prisoner, who previously
filed an unsuccessful habeas petition,
should be regarded as an unauthorized
successive habeas petition.  We conclude
2in this case that the District Court correctly
dismissed those claims in Pridgen’s Rule
60(b) motion which sought to invalidate
his underlying state conviction because
they constituted the equivalent of a second
habeas petition.  We also affirm the
District Court’s denial of the remaining
portion of his motion, though on different
grounds.1
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Pridgen was convicted in July 1993
of first-degree murder in state court in
Lancaster County, Pennsylvania.  He was
sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment.
At trial, the government established that
Pridgen fired a handgun at Sheila Wright
with the intent to kill her, but, instead, he
shot and killed Colin Koulesser, who was
positioned behind Wright.  After an
unsuccessful direct appeal, Pridgen filed a
petition under the Pennsylvania Post
Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel,
prosecutorial misconduct, and actual
innocence.  The Court of Common Pleas
of Lancaster County denied Pridgen’s
petition and he appealed.  
While Pridgen’s appeal of the
denial of his PCRA petition was still
pending in the Pennsylvania courts,
Pridgen filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
The District Court, adopting the Report
and Recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge, dismissed the habeas petition
without prejudice on the ground that
Pridgen had failed to exhaust his state
court remedies.  Thereafter, the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the denial
of Pridgen’s PCRA petition, and on
January 12, 1999, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied his appeal.  At this
point, Pridgen’s state remedies had been
exhausted and he became eligible to file a
petition for federal habeas relief.  28
U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Holloway v.
Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 714 (3d Cir. 2004).  
Section 2244(d) of the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) of 1996 sets forth a one-year
statute of limitations period following
direct review in the state courts within
which a state prisoner may file a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.  28 U.S.C. §
2244.  However, section 2244(d)(2)
provides that “the time during which a
properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review with
respect to the pertinent judgment or claim
is pending shall not be counted toward any
period of limitation under this subsection.”
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added).
  
Rather than filing a petition for
habeas relief, Pridgen, in February 1999,
    1The District Court concluded that it
was bound, under the law of the case
doctrine, by an earlier panel of this Court’s
denial of a Certificate of Appealability to
Pridgen on a separate claim raised in his
60(b) motion.  Because we conclude that
Pridgen’s second PCRA petition was not
“properly filed” under AEDPA, we do not
reach the law of the case issue.
3filed a second PCRA petition in state
court.  The Court of Common Pleas denied
the petition because it was filed beyond the
one-year period permitted by state law.  42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545 (1982).  The
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, and
on June 20, 2000, the state Supreme Court
declined to hear the appeal.  
On July 24, 2000, a year and a half
after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
denied his first PCRA petition, Pridgen
again filed for habeas relief in federal
court.  The District Court dismissed the
federal petition, reasoning that, because
the Pennsylvania courts dismissed
Pridgen’s second PCRA petition as
untimely, the PCRA petition had not been
“properly filed” and thus could not act to
toll the one-year statute of limitations
under AEDPA.  The District Court
reasoned that because the section 2244
statute of limitations began to run on
January 13, 1999 (the day after the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his
appeal), the one-year period had expired
by the time Pridgen filed his habeas
petition in July 2000.  28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1)(A).  Therefore, the District
Court dismissed Pridgen’s habeas petition
in its entirety and declined to issue him a
Certificate of Appealability (COA).  
Pridgen then petitioned this Court
for a COA under 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A).  We denied the petition for
the same reasons stated by the District
Court – Pridgen’s habeas petition was not
timely filed (Order, October 31, 2001,
Appendix A-41).  While his petition for a
COA was pending in our Court, Pridgen
filed, in the District Court, a Motion for
Relief from Judgment under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), (2) and (6).2
Pridgen’s motion set forth three separate
grounds for relief: he sought relief
pursuant to Rule 60(b) on the grounds that
newly discovered evidence and evidence
that he inadvertently failed to include in
his habeas petition demonstrate that (1) the
state court erred in denying his second
PCRA petition as untimely; (2) the state
court lacked jurisdiction to rule that the
claims raised in his second petition were
    2 Rule 60(b) provides in part:
( b )  M i s t a k e s ;
Inadvertence; Excusable
Neglect; Newly Discovered
Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On
motion and upon such terms
as are just, the court may
relieve a party or a party’s
legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following
reasons: (1)  mis take ,
inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not
have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b) . . . or (6)
any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of
the judgment.  
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
4waived; and (3) his second PCRA petition
was a “properly filed application for [s]tate
post-conviction relief or other collateral
review” under § 2244(d)(2) that tolls the
AEDPA statute of limitations applicable to
his federal habeas petition.  Pridgen also
posited that his “properly filed” claim
presented “extraordinary circumstances”
that warranted relief under the catchall
provision of Rule 60(b)(6).
The District Court first considered
whether Pridgen’s Rule 60(b) motion was
in essence a second or successive habeas
petition.  In its written opinion, the Court
pointed out that such an analysis was
necessary because “[a] state prisoner
seeking to file a second or successive §
2254 habeas petition must as a preliminary
step obtain an order from the appropriate
court of appeals authorizing the district
court  to con sider the mo tion .”3
Memorandum Op. at 6.  Pridgen had
received no such authorization.  The Court
noted that a majority of the courts of
appeals that have ruled on the issue have
held that a Rule 60(b) motion, challenging
a prior judgment denying habeas relief
should, in most cases, be treated as the
functional equivalent of a second or
successive habeas petition requiring, under
AEDPA, authorization from a court of
appeals.  Id. at 8 (citations omitted).  The
Court determined that it had to dismiss the
first and second arguments in Pridgen’s
60(b) motion because, in its view, Pridgen
was seeking relief that would be available
to him only in a second habeas petition.  In
other words, those portions of Pridgen’s
60(b) motion that should have been raised
in a second habeas petition had to be
dismissed because they amounted to an
unauthorized successive filing under
AEDPA.
    3 Section 2244(b) of the AEDPA
provides in pertinent part:
(3)(A) Before a second or
success ive  applic at ion
permitted by this section is
filed in the district court, the
applicant shall move in the
appropriate court of appeals
for an order authorizing the
district court to consider the
application.  
(B) A motion in the court of
appe als for an order
authorizing the district court
to consider a second or
successive application shall
be determined by a three-
judge panel of the court of
appeals.
(C) The court of appeals
may authorize the filing of a
second or  success ive
application only if it
d e t e r m in e s  t h a t  t h e
application makes a prima
facie showing that the
application satisfies the
r e q ui r e men ts  o f  t h is
subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). 
5With regard to the third and final
argument in Pridgen’s 60(b) motion, that
his second PCRA petition was properly
filed for purposes of AEDPA, the District
Court determined that it was bound, under
the law of the case doctrine, by this
Court’s prior ruling that the second PCRA
was not timely filed.  Based on that ruling,
the District Court denied this claim, but,
nevertheless, granted Pridgen a COA on
this issue.  
For the reasons that follow, we
agree with the District Co urt’s
classification of  certain portions of
Pridgen’s 60(b) motion as attacks on his
underlying conviction and we concur in
the Court’s ultimate dismissal of those
claims.  Additionally, we affirm the
District Court’s denial of Pridgen’s
“properly filed” argument because, in our
view, Pridgen’s untimely second PCRA
petition failed to toll AEDPA’s statute of
limitations. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW
A district court’s denial of a Rule
60(b) motion is typically reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.  Brown v. Phila. Hous.
Auth., 350 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2003).
However, the preliminary question
regarding the legal status of the 60(b)
motion is an issue of law that we review de
novo.  See Planned Parenthood of Cent.
N.J. v. Attorney General of State of N.J.,
297 F.3d 253, 259 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he
legal interpretation of a procedural rule is
reviewed de novo.” (citation omitted)). 
Only one question was certified for
appeal by the District Court: whether the
law of the case doctrine prevented the
District Court from reconsidering its
earlier ruling that Pridgen’s second PCRA
was untimely and, therefore, not properly
filed for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244.
However, we must first satisfy ourselves
that the District Court properly exercised
jurisdiction over Pridgen’s Rule 60(b)
motion, which requires us to consider
whether it should have been treated as a
second or successive habeas petition or a
proper Rule 60(b) motion.4   A
determination that the Rule 60(b) motion
was in essence a successive habeas
petition means that under AEDPA the
District Court did not have jurisdiction to
entertain the motion because this Court
had not authorized Pridgen to file a
successive habeas petition.  28 U.S.C. §
2244(b). 
III. DISCUSSION
A.Whether Pridgen’s Rule 60(b) motion
constitutes a second habeas petition
Several circuit courts have
addressed the issue of whether a Rule
60(b) motion made by a habeas corpus
petitioner can be considered following the
dismissal of a federal habeas petition.  The
Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have
    4As noted earlier, because we conclude
that Pridgen’s “properly filed” argument in
his 60(b) motion should have been denied
on the merits, we will not reach the law of
the case issue.  
6adopted the position that a Rule 60(b)
motion filed after the dismissal of a federal
petition for habeas corpus should per se be
treated as a second or successive habeas
petition under AEDPA.  Thus, such
motions can never be entertained by a
district court without permission from the
appropriate court of appeals.  See Lopez v.
Douglas, 141 F.3d 974, 975 (10th Cir.
1998); Felker v. Turpin, 101 F.3d 657
(11th Cir. 1996); McQueen v. Scroggy, 99
F.3d 1302, 1335 (6th Cir. 1996).  The
Eleventh Circuit reasoned in Felker that
allowing courts to consider Rule 60(b)
motions in habeas cases would invite
prisoners to file second or successive
collateral attacks on their convictions,
thereby evading the limitations that
Congress set forth in AEDPA.  101 F.3d at
661.
The Second Circuit alone has taken
the position that “a motion under Rule
60(b) to vacate a judgment denying habeas
is not a second or successive habeas
petition and should therefore be treated as
any other motion under Rule 60(b).”
Rodriguez v. Mitchell, 252 F.3d 191, 198
(2d Cir. 2001).  The court explained in
Rodriguez that a Rule 60(b) motion does
not seek the same relief requested in a
habeas petition (which is, generally, to
have  the  under lying  convic t ion
invalidated).  Rather, such a motion “seeks
only to vacate the federal court judgment
dismissing the habeas petition.”  Id.  In
other words, a Rule 60(b) motion is
“merely a step along the way” to habeas
relief.  Id. at 199.  Consequently, the
Second Circuit determined that the
customary scope of Rule 60(b) does not
offend AEDPA.  Id. 
A plurality view emerges between
these two ends of the spectrum.  The First,
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits
maintain that a Rule 60(b) motion may be
considered, but not if it conflicts with the
provisions of AEDPA or if its purpose is
to attack the underlying conviction.  The
Ninth Circuit held in Thompson v.
Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir.
1998) that “[i]n most cases when the
factual predicate for a Rule 60(b) motion
also states a claim for a successive petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) . . . the Rule
60(b) motion should be treated as a
successive habeas petition . . . .  We do not
foreclose the possibility, however, that
under a different factual situation a 60(b)
motion filed after the denial of an initial
petition for habeas corpus would not have
to comply with the AEDPA’s successive
petition requirements.”).  In Dunlap v.
Litscher, the Seventh Circuit stated that
AEDPA’s provisions “are clear and bar a
district court from using Rule 60(b) to give
a prisoner broader relief from a judgment
rendered by the court in the prisoner’s
federal habeas corpus (including section
2255) proceeding.  Otherwise AEDPA’s
limitations on collateral attack would be
set at naught.”  301 F.3d 873, 875 (7th Cir.
2002).  The court clarified, however, that
“[i]t is only when Rule 60(b) conflicts with
AEDPA that it is unavailable to a
prisoner.”  Id.  The Seventh Circuit
envisioned circumstances in which a
prisoner’s motion to vacate a judgment
under Rule 60(b) would not offend
7AEDPA (for example, if it were
discovered that the state had fraudulently
procured the dismissal of the habeas
petition).  Id. at 875-76.  
Under the pre-AEDPA habeas
statute, the Eighth Circuit took a position
similar to that of the Seventh.  See Guinan
v. Delo, 5 F.3d 313, 316 (8th Cir. 1993)
(“We do not rule out the possibility that a
habeas case may present circumstances in
which a Rule 60(b) motion might properly
be examined as such rather than as a
subsequent habeas petition.  This,
however, is not such a case”).  In Guinan,
the court stated that, had the Rule 60(b)
motion been timely filed, the district court
should have treated it as a second habeas
petition “because it [sought] to raise
claims that either could have been raised in
Guinan’s original habeas petition or were
raised therein and adjudicated.”  Id. at 317.
In Hunt v. Nuth, 57 F.3d 1327,
1338 (4th Cir. 1995), another pre-AEDPA
case, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial
of a Rule 60(b) motion by a prisoner who
attempted to correct his habeas counsel’s
failure to include several claims in his
initial habeas petition.  The district court
had applied the “cause and prejudice”
standard for determining ineffective
assistance of counsel under habeas law,
rejecting petitioner’s plea to apply the
standard set forth under Rule 60(b).  The
court of appeals affirmed, holding that a
district court “may properly treat a Rule
60(b) motion as a successive habeas
petition and require that the defendant
show cause and prejudice for the failure to
raise claims in an earlier petition.”  Id. at
1339.  Because petitioner’s counsel had
omitted claims that would have been
cognizable on federal habeas review, the
Rule 60(b) motion was deemed to
constitute a successive habeas petition.  Id.
We find the reasoning of the First,
Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits  convincing.  We are particularly
persuaded by the First Circu it’s
explanation in Rodwell v. Pepe, 324 F.3d
66, 67 (1st Cir. 2003), that “AEDPA’s
restrictions on the filing of second or
successive habeas petitions make it
implausible to believe that Congress
wanted Rule 60(b) to operate under full
throttle in the habeas context.”  We
concur, and hold that, in those instances in
which the factual predicate of a
petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion attacks the
manner in which the earlier habeas
judgment was procured and not the
underlying conviction, the Rule 60(b)
motion may be adjudicated on the merits.
However, when the Rule 60(b) motion
seeks to collaterally attack the petitioner’s
underlying conviction, the motion should
be treated as a successive habeas petition.
We believe that this rule is consonant with
Congress’s goal of restricting the
availability of relief to habeas petitioners.
142 Cong. Rec. S3446-02 (daily ed. Apr.
17, 1996) (Statements of Senator Hatch);
Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664
(1996).  Prior to AEDPA, it was generally
understood that there were no limitations
on a prisoner’s filing successive habeas
petitions.  Indeed, as far back as 1924, the
Supreme Court had noted in Salinger v.
8Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 230 (1924), that the
doctrine of res judicata did not apply to a
petition for habeas corpus.  Thus, res
judicata did not prevent a prisoner from
filing an endless stream of habeas
petitions.  AEDPA changed the landscape
in 1996 by severely limiting the number of
successive habeas petitions a prisoner is
entitled to file, as well as the time period
in which to seek relief.  Fahy v. Horn, 240
F.3d 239, 243 (3d Cir. 2001).   
Against this background, we turn to
the District Court’s disposition of
Pridgen’s Rule 60(b) motion.  Pridgen
raised three principal issues in the motion:
first, that the state court erred in its
determination that his second PCRA
petition was untimely; second, that the
state court lacked jurisdiction to rule that
the claims raised in his second PCRA
petition had been waived; and third, that
notwithstanding the state court’s
timeliness ruling, his second PCRA
petition was a properly filed application
for state post-conviction relief or other
collateral review under AEDPA, and it
therefore tolled the applicable section 2244
limitations period.  With respect to his first
two arguments, we agree with the District
Court that Pridgen simply sought to
relitigate issues that the District Court had
already considered and rejected when
ruling on Pridgen’s habeas petition.  If
Pridgen were to succeed on these claims,
the result would be the reversal of the state
court judgment rejecting his second PCRA
petition.  The proper forum to raise these
claims is in a habeas proceeding.  
Regarding Pridgen’s contention that
his second PCRA was “properly filed” for
the purposes of tolling the AEDPA statute
of limitations, we believe that the District
Court properly regarded this argument as
an attack on the habeas proceeding, rather
than on Pridgen’s underlying state
conviction.  This is because Pridgen does
not argue that he is entitled to a new trial.
Rather, he contends that the District Court
misinterpreted Pennsylvania law and
AEDPA.  Unlike the other claims in his
60(b) motion, this ground, if proven,
would necessarily result in the reopening
of Pridgen’s federal habeas proceeding.
This portion of Pridgen’s motion would
not necessarily affect the state court
judgments in Pridgen’s case.  Thus, as to
the “properly filed” issue, we conclude
that the District Court properly exercised
jurisdiction without Pridgen having first
obtained Court of Appeals approval under
section 2244(b) of AEDPA.5 
B.Whether the District Court properly
denied Pridgen’s “properly filed” claim
As we previously stated, Pridgen
claims that regardless of the state court’s
ruling his second PCRA petition untimely,
    5 Alth oug h the  D is t r ic t  Cour t ’s
disposition of the other arguments in
Pridgen’s Rule 60(b) motion has not been
raised on appeal, we note that because
those arguments directed their attacks at
actions of the state court, they would not
be cognizable under a Rule 60(b) motion
pursuant to the rule we set forth today.  
9the petition was a “properly filed”
application for state post-conviction relief
under AEDPA.  The District Court did not
address the merits of this claim, but
instead denied it because a prior panel of
this Court had earlier denied Pridgen a
Certificate of Appealability (COA).  The
District Court reasoned that it was bound,
under the law of the case doctrine, by the
panel’s denial of a COA to Pridgen on the
grounds that his habeas corpus petition
was untimely.  The District Court certified
this issue for appeal.  We agree with the
District Court’s decision to deny relief but
for reasons other than those expressed by
the Court.  We conclude that because the
state court ruled that Pridgen’s second
PCRA petition was not timely filed, it did
not toll the one-year AEDPA statute of
limitations.  We therefore do not reach the
law of the case issue in concluding that the
District Court was correct in dismissing
the petition.
The standards for deciding a Rule
60(b)(6) motion are well settled and
familiar.  “[L]egal error does not by itself
warrant the application of Rule 60(b). ....
Since legal error can usually be corrected
on appeal, that factor without more does
not justify the granting of relief under Rule
60( b)(6 ).”   Ma rtinez-McBean v.
Government of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d,
908, 912 (3d Cir.1977).  In Page v.
Schweiker, 786 F.2d 150, 158 (3rd
Cir.1986), the court held that only
“extraordinary, and special circumstances”
justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6).  No
extraordinary circumstances are presented
here that would warrant the District Court
revisiting its prior decision that the habeas
petition was untimely filed.  Moreover, our
decision in Merritt v. Blaine. 326 F.3d 157
(3d Cir. 2003), reinforces the District
Court’s decision.  In Merritt, we addressed
the same argument that Pridgen makes
here: namely, whether an untimely
application for state post-conviction relief
by a petitioner was “properly filed” for
purposes of the federal statute’s tolling
provisions.
In Merritt, the petitioner appealed,
on timeliness grounds, from the dismissal
of his habeas corpus petition challenging a
Pennsylvania conviction.  326 F.3d at 158-
59.  After an unsuccessful direct appeal,
Merritt filed a PCRA petition, which was
ultimately denied by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court on January 17, 1995.  Id. at
159.  On December 20, 1996, Merritt filed
a second PCRA petition in state court,
seeking to introduce new ballistics
evidence.  The Pennsylvania court denied
the second PCRA petition both on the
merits and because it was untimely.  Id. at
160.  Merritt, like Pridgen, had failed to
file his second PCRA petition in
accordance wi th  the t ime l iness
requirements of 41 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
9545(b)(1). 
On May 5, 2000, Merritt filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court.  On appeal from the
district court’s denial of the habeas
petition, we concluded that when a
Pennsylvania court holds that a petition for
collateral relief is untimely, it is not
“properly filed” under AEDPA.  326 F.3d
at 166 (citing Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239
10
(3d Cir. 2001)).  Furthermore, we rejected
Merritt’s argument, which is identical to
the argument Pridgen makes here, that
even if his PCRA petition had been
dismissed as untimely, it was still
“properly filed” if the applicant asserted a
statutory exception to the Pennsylvania
statute of limitations.  Id. 
Our decision in Merritt drew
support from Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S.
214 (2002), an opinion involving
California’s timeliness standard for post-
conviction petitions.  In California, a
petitioner who sought to appeal the
dismissal of a state petition was required to
file a second, original petition in a higher
state court within a “reasonable” period of
time.  Id. at 221.  The Supreme Court held
that if the California petition was
ultimately found untimely, AEDPA’s
statute of limitations would not be tolled
while the question of unreasonable delay
was pending before the state court.  Id. at
225-26.  As is the case in Pennsylvania,
the California statute of limitations for
post-conviction petitions was not an
absolute bar.  Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court stated that even when the state court
considered the merits of the underlying
state claim as well as its timeliness, if the
petitioner’s delay was ultimately found to
have been unreasonable it would not toll
the AEDPA statute of limitations.  Id. at
226.                
As in Merritt, Pridgen was unable
to convince the Pennsylvania courts that
his second PCRA petition met one of the
state’s statutory exceptions for timeliness.
For these reasons, Pridgen’s petition was
not “properly filed” and therefore did not
toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations. 
IV. CONCLUSION
 In sum, we conclude that when a
Rule 60(b) motion is in conflict with
provisions of AEDPA or is a direct attack
on a state conviction, it constitutes the
equivalent of a successive habeas corpus
petition and should be dismissed.  We
accordingly affirm the District Court’s
decision dismissing those portions of
Pridgen’s Rule 60(b) motion that
represented challenges to his state
conviction, and were not authorized under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).  We also affirm
the District Court’s denial of Pridgen’s
“properly filed” claim because Pridgen
failed to satisfy AEDPA’s limitations
period.
                                                           
